We argue that a certain type of many minds (and many worlds) interpretations of quantum mechanics, e. g. due to Lockwood (and Deutsch), do not provide a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilistic algorithm. By contrast, in Albert and Loewer's version of the many minds interpretation there is a coherent interpretation of the quantum mechanical probabilities. We consider Albert and Loewer's probability interpretation in the context of Bell-type and GHZ-type states and argue that it implies a certain (weak) form of nonlocality.
Introduction
In this paper we shall consider the question whether and how the notion of probability makes sense in many minds interpretations of quantum mechanics. We shall further focus on the implications of the notion of probability in these approaches on the question of nonlocality. We shall mainly refer to two versions of many minds interpretations: Albert and Loewer's [3] stochastic version in which the minds don't supervene on physical states, and Lockwood's [15] version in which there is full supervenience. These two versions have been discussed in some detail in a special symposium hosted by this Journal [23] . Lockwood's approach to probabilities seems to be accepted amongst many authors in the many worlds tradition (though with different styles) e. g. Deutsch [5] , Zurek [27] , Saunders [21] , Papineau [18] , Vaidman [24] , and others. It is in fact based on Deutsch's [5] approach to probabilities in his many worlds interpretation. We shall also consider Albert and Loewer's stochastic version of many minds in the context of Bell's theorem.
The structure of the paper is as follows. We first briefly present Albert and Loewer's version of the many minds interpretation and we set up the problem of interpreting the probabilities in a many minds (worlds) picture (section 2). In Section 3 we present and discuss the supervenience versions (focusing on Lockwood) of the many minds interpretation, and we argue that in these versions the probability interpretation is wanting. Then in section 4 we argue that the Albert-Loewer many minds interpretation implies a certain weak form of nonlocal correlations between subsets of minds. Finally, in Section 5 we demonstrate the nonlocality of the Albert-Loewer interpreration using the Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger [12] (GHZ) set up.
To get a quick grip on many minds interpretations consider the scheme of a generic (impulsive) measurement of the z-spin variable of an electron in noncollapsing quantum mechanics. Take a composite of quantum system, apparatus and observer (respectively) S + M + O initially in the state
where |α| 2 + |β| 2 = 1. Here the |± z are the z-spin eigenstates, |ψ 0 is the ready state of M and |Φ 0 is some suitable state of O's brain initiating conscious mental states. We assume that the evolution of the global state is described by the Schrödinger equation alone, i. e. there is no collapse of the quantum state. The measurement interaction between S and M takes the state (1) to the superposition
where as can be seen a one-to-one correlation is brought about between the spin states |± z and the pointer states |ψ ± , but in such a way that the quantum states of both S and M become entangled in (2) . The interaction between M and the observer O takes the global state to the final superposition
where the |Φ ± are the observer's brain states corresponding to her mental states 1 . As can be seen the state (3) is now also entangled and the reduced state of the observer is truly mixed. If one takes this theory to be complete simpliciter (called by Albert [2] the bare theory), then one faces the measurement problem since the measurement has no definite result. On this view the quantum statistical algorithm which is an algorithm about the probabilities of measurement results makes no sense (see Albert [2] Chp. 6 for more details). Thus in order to avoid the measurement problem, one needs somehow to supplement the bare theory's description.
Albert and Loewer
Many minds interpretations take the bare theory to be indeed complete and exactly true but only with respect to the physics, including the physics of the brain. In other words, the quantum state never collapses and no hidden variables are added to the quantum mechanical description. To supplement the bare theory, assumptions are made with respect to the mental states |Φ± . Albert and Loewer [1988] make the following two assumptions:
AL1 The brain states corresponding to mental states |Φ ± are associated at all times with a continuous infinity of nonphysical entities called minds (even for a single observer).
AL2 Minds do not obey the Schrödinger evolution (in particular, the superposition principle) but evolve in time in a genuine probabilistic fashion. For a given measurement, involving a conscious observer, there is one specific probability measure, given by the Born rule, that prescribes the chances for each mind to evolve from an initial |Φ to a final brainmental state |Φ i .
In the measurement scheme above each single mind corresponds initially to the state |Φ 0 and evolves in a stochastic fashion to one of the two final brain-mental states |Φ± with the usual born probabilities: |α| 2 for a + result and |β| 2 for a − result. The divergence of the minds occurs during the evolution of the global state from (2) to (3). Let us denote by |Φ(m) a quantum brain state indexed by a subset m of the set of minds. The complete description of the post-measurement state includes the quantum state, and the corresponding subsets of the set of minds. Therefore, one needs to replace (3) with
Here we use the notation Ψ f (m, n), to make explicit the Albert-Loewer idea that the quantum brain states correspond to, and are indexed by, subsets of the set of minds. In the state (4) we see that the minds in the subset m follow the brain state in the + branch of the superposition, and those in the subset n follow the brain state in the − branch. The evolution of the minds is genuinely stochastic. This means that before the minds actually diverge into the branches in the state (2), there is no determinate fact of the matter about which branch each one of the minds will eventually follow. The membership of a given mind in the subset m (or n) becomes a fact at the same time that the final state (4) obtains. The standard quantum mechanical probability is thus understood as the chance for each single mind to end up in either the m-subset or the n-subset in the state (4).
The motivation for assuming a multiplicity of minds here, rather than a single mind that literally chooses one of the branches in the state (4), is two-fold. First, in a single mind theory all the brain states of the observer after a split are mindless, accept for the one that is actually tracked by the mind. This leads to the so-called mindless hulk problem (see Albert [2] ) which does not arise in the many minds theories. Second, Bell's theorem implies that a single mind theory can recover the quantum predictions in Bell and EPR-type experiments only by allowing strong nonlocal dependence between the trajectories of the minds of remote observers (of the kind exhibited in usual hidden variable theories; see Lockwood [15] ). The Albert and Loewer theory avoids such strong nonlocality by associating with each brain state of an observer after a split an infinity of minds, and by postulating a genuine stochastic dynamics for the minds (see below).
To sum up, we can characterize Albert and Loewer's interpretation as follows. (i) There are no collapses, but the expansion of the global state (4) in terms of the brain states |Φ i and their relative states, e. g. the pointer states |ψ i , is taken to describes our experience. (ii) There is a random element built into the theory. The fact that the time evolution of the minds is stochastic is depicted by the quantum mechanical probabilities. (iii) The probability measure is conditional on a given measurement. (iv) Individual minds (unlike the proportion of minds) do not supervene on brain states. This means that an m-mind can be exchanged with an n-mind in the superposition (4) with no corresponding change in the physics. In fact, the chance interpretation of the probability measure in AL2 implies this failure of supervenience in Albert and Loewer's version. This is the so-called dualistic aspect of this version (see e. g. Lockwood [15] , Loewer [14] ).
Let us see how the Albert-Loewer approach reflects on the relationship between branching and relative frequencies. As is well known, this is a major problem in the Everett picture where the number of branches resulting from a given quantum measurement is not related to the quantum mechanical probabilities. For example, in a measurement with two possible results the quantum state will consist of two branches corresponding to the two results of the measurement irrespective of the probabilities for each result. This has the consequence that in a repeated measurement the relative frequencies of an outcome (along a branch) will most likely mismatch the quantum mechanical predictions. It then follows that the empirical success of quantum mechanics, as observed by us, must be viewed as a miracle since most of the Everett branches will not exhibit the right quantum mechanical frequencies.
This problem can be solved if one postulates that the standard Born rule, applied for each measurement, represents the probability of the branch. In other words, one simply brings in the probability as an extra postulate in addition to the branching. For example, consider a process where at t 1 a measurement with two possible results and probabilities is performed. Then follows another measurement at t 2 , with three possible results with identical probabilities 1 3 , and so on. A suitable law of large numbers can be proved for such a tree. In particular, in a sequence of identical measurements, the frequency on almost all branches will be close in value to the quantum mechanical probability distribution on the set of measurement outcomes. (e. g. Everett [9] , DeWitt [6] , Hartle [13] .). The Albert-Loewer approach provides a simple explanation: Each individual mind performs a (classical) random walk on the tree, with the probabilities indicated on the branches. The fact that a typical mind perceives the quantum mechanical frequencies simply follows from the theory of random walks (or branching processes).
However, quantum mechanics assigns, in advance, probabilities to all possible measurement trees. Given a quantum state of the system, we can calculate in advance the probabilities of all possible sequences of measurements. For example, insted of the measurement just considered, we can perform at time t 1 a measurement with three possible outcomes whose probabilities are . At t 2 we do not measure anything, and then at t 3 we perform a particular measurement with two possible outcomes, and so forth. The probability for each step in the sequence is known at the outset. Schrödinger [22] noticed that "at no moment in time is there a collective distribution of classical states which would be in agreement with the sum total of quantum mechan-ical predictions". This means that while each measurement sequence can be seen as a classical random walk, there is no (non contextual) classical probability distribution which assigns the correct probabilities to all the branches of all possible trees simultaneously. This is a major difference between the quantum concept of probability and the classical one. One manifestation of this difference is the violation of Bell inequalities. (Pitowsky [1994] ).
We can see why the assumptions of Albert and Loewer are almost inevitable. Suppose, contrary to AL2, that the trajectory of each mind is predetermined before measurement. Now, consider Alice and Bob who participate in a typical EPR experiment, Alice on the left and Bob on the right. In each run they can each choose a direction along which to measure the spin. We now face the task of choosing, in advance, the appropriate subsets for each person set of minds, corresponding to each possible result, in each possible choice of directions. From Bell's theorem it follows that the only way to do that, and obtain the right probabilities, is to violate Bell's inequality. In the present context this means that the trajectories of some Alice minds depend on Bob's choice of direction and vice versa. What we have, in other words, is a non local hidden variable theory in disguise (with the minds playing the role of hidden variables). Note that this formal argument does not depend on any spatial characteristic of the minds themselves, or lack thereof. This is part of the reason why Albert and Loewer assume that the membership of a given mind in a given subset becomes a fact only at the same time that the final state (e.g. state (4)) obtains. They do not assume that there is a distribution on the set of minds that explains the sum total of the quantum mechanical predictions. Only after the experiment, a random partition of the set of minds into the appropriate subsets is induced.
Probabilities in Lockwood's Version
We now turn to analyzing the approach to probabilities in all version of the many minds interpretation which assume complete supervenience of the mental on the phsyical.
2 For convenience we shall focus on Lockwood's [15] approach to probabilities, but our analysis can be applied mutatis mutandi to other versions. Lockwood aims explicitly at a picture in which there is full supervenience of the minds on the brain states (or the corresponding branches) and there is absolutely no stochastic behavior of the minds. Such versions assume:
SUP1 The brain states corresponding to mental states |Φ ± are associated at all times with a continuous infinity of nonphysical entities called minds. But minds supervene on the brain states |Φ ± .
Lockwood's idea of supervenience of the minds on the |Φ ± means that he rejects the description of Albert and Loewer given by the state (4) and adopts instead the description given by (3) as a complete description of the physics and of the minds. In other words, in the theory of Albert and Loewer brain states are indexed by subsets of minds, whereas in Lockwood's version subsets of minds are indexed by brain states.
To make sense of the quantum mechanical probabilities Lockwood defines a probability measure over subsets of the minds as follows.
SUP2
The standard Born rule defines a unique probability measure over subsets of minds, such that for any measurement (involving a conscious observer) the measure prescribes the proportions of minds following each final branch of the superposition. For example, in the post-measurement state (3), the subset of minds following the + branch is assigned the measure |α| 2 and the subset of minds following the − branch the measure |β| 2 .
Thus, for Lockwood too, the quantum measure describes how many minds follow each branch of the post-measurement state (such as state (3)). Let us also note that Deutsch's [5] probability measure, as well as many other supporters of the supervenience view, is essentially the same, except that it is sometimes defined over subsets of worlds.
Lockwood's version differs from Albert and Loewer's with respect to the interpretation of probability in that the evolution of the minds is not genuinely random in the Albert-Loewer sense. However, in versions that assume supervenience it is not at all clear what the dynamics of the minds is. Nor is it clear how one could make the dynamics compatible with supervenience. We shall consider two possible interpretations: 1) Let Λ be the set of minds of the observer. Minds supervene on brain states. This means that with each brain state |Φ , which corresponds to a conscious perception of a measurement outcome, Lockwood associates a subset m(|Φ ) ⊂ Λ. Suppose that |Φ + is the brain state of an observer perceiving 'spin up' (of a quantum system and apparatus in a given state, on a given day, in a given weather, and so on (including whatever it takes to specify the brain state uniquely). Then the probability measure of the subset m(|Φ + ) is |α| 2 . Now, if we assume that the association |Φ → m(|Φ ) of brain states with subsets of minds is fixed in advance of any measurement, we run into a problem. We require, in fact, a probability measure on the set of minds that will be in agreement with the totality of quantum mechanical predictions. This implies non locality and contextuality in the dynamics of the minds that was explained in the previous section.
this view as denying that a label can be attached to each of the minds at an early time that would distinguish it from all the other minds at a later time. As a result this view holds that there are no facts of the matter concerning the evolution of a single mind between any two times, and in particular between times during which the quantum state evolves into superpositions of branches indexed by different mental states.
Consider for instance the time evolution taking the state (2) at time t 1 to the final state (3) at time t 2 . On the instantaneous view all we can say about the behavior of the minds is that at t 1 the total set of the minds is attached to the state |Φ 0 , and at t 2 a subset of the minds with measure |α| 2 is attached to the final brain state |Φ + and a subset with measure |β| 2 to the brain state |Φ − . However, there is no fact of the matter as to which mind in (2) evolved into which branch in (3) in the sense that there is no uniquely true mapping of the minds at t 1 to any one of the two subsets in t 2 (see e. g. Lockwood [15] p.183).
It seems, however, that one should also want to maintain that Λ, the set of all minds, is itself time invariant. To put it differently, minds are not created and destroyed through time (presumably, until the person dies). Now, this is utterly inconsistent with the instantaneous minds view. The first axiom of set theory, the axiom of equality, states that two sets are equal when they have the same elements. If Λ at t 1 is identical to Λ at t 2 there always exists a mapping, or a succession relation between the minds at the two times. Simply take the identity mapping! Likewise, there is always a fact of the matter regarding which element λ ∈ Λ is an element of the subset m(|Φ + ).
And so, if Λ is time invariant, each mind in fact is labeled through time just as Albert and Loewer insist. But then the question of whether such minds evolve in genuine stochastic fashion or in a deterministic fasion is still pertinent (see e. g. Butterfield [4] ). In other words, on such a view one has to provide a clear answer to the question whether the proposed dynamics of the minds conforms to the Albert-Loewer stochastic type, in which case one has to give up on supervenience. Alternatively, one could adopt the deterministic version, in which case the evolution of the minds, in e. g. EPR situations, is sometimes determined by remote spacelike separated events.
But perhaps one would insist that Λ is not time invariant, and at each time t there exists a different set of minds Λ t . Minds are born with every experiment, they briefly supervene on the brain state, and then die like butterflies. What precisely such a theory explains is not clear to us.
It is entirely possible that supporters of supervenience intend an interpretation that is completely different from those that we have discussed. For example, in Donald's [8] interpretation there is a temporally extended notion of a mind according to which a mind is identified at any moment of time with its actual history up to that moment. The set of minds in this version satisfies a well defined stochastic process, i. e. the minds' dynamics is explicitly stochastic. However, as we have just argued, the Albert-Loewer stochastic non supervening character of the minds seems to be necessary, if one wishes to have probabilistic assertions in the usual sense of the word in the Everett tradition, while keeping the theory local in Bell's sense.
Chance and Nonlocality
We now turn to analyze more carefully the question of locality in the AlbertLoewer version. Albert and Loewer [3] and Albert [2] (see also Maudlin [16] ) argue that their version is completely local. On the other hand as we saw their chancy evolution of the minds is designed to deliver the standard quantum mechanical predictions which, we know, violate the Bell inequality. The stochastic evolution of the minds which occurs after an actual measurement solves the problem of Bell's nonlocality. However, in what follows we shall argue that there is a weaker notion of locality that is violated even in the Albert-Loewer version.
Let us start with Albert and Loewer's argument. Consider the singlet state of the two particle system:
and suppose that observer 1 (Alice) measures some spin observable of particle 1, and observer 2 (Bob) measures some (not necessarily the same) spin observable of particle 2. The overall state after these two measurements will be a superposition of branches (in general four branches). In each branch one of the two measurements has some definite outcome. Now, Albert and Loewer's argument is that no matter which observable gets measured by Bob, the chances of Alice to see a + result or a − result are exactly one-half. On this picture this means that one-half of the minds of Alice will see an up result and one-half will see a down result independently of the measurement of Bob. And the same goes for Bob 4 . Moreover, Albert and Loewer stipulate that the evolution of the minds of each observer is controlled by the reduced physical state of that observer alone (see section 2).
5 And as we have just argued this is sufficient to insure that the evolution of the minds will satisfy the frequencies predicted by the quantum mechanical algorithm. According to Albert and Loewer, this is as far as the many minds picture goes.
In particular, Albert and Loewer [3] , (see also Albert [2] , p. 132) argue, there are just no matters of fact about the correlations of the minds of Alice and Bob. And if no such correlations obtain, the Albert-Loewer picture is ipso facto local and Bell's theorem is simply irrelevant at this stage. The correlations which Bell's theorem is about, they maintain, will obtain only in a local way by means of an additional physical interaction between Alice and Bob (or between each one of them and a third observer). For example, when they communicate to each other (or to a third party) their results. Once such a local communication occurs it is easy to see that the many minds picture gives the correct quantum mechanical predictions.
We shall now argue, however, that there are correlations between subsets of the minds of Alice and Bob after their minds have evolved to the final state, and prior to any local interaction between them. Consider why. It is true that the chance distribution of each of the observers' minds is independent of the measurement on the other wing. This just means that the reduced state of each of the observers is independent of the interactions occurring on the other wing. This feature is a transposition of the standard quantum mechanical no-signaling theorem. According to Albert and Loewer's dynamical rule for the minds the evolution of the minds of each observer is controlled solely by the reduced (local) state of that observer, and is independent of the state of the other observer. With each experiment performed by an observer the set of minds associated with the observer's brain splits into many subsets, one for each possible outcome. The probability of each outcome is just the measure of the corresponding subset. Another way to say the same thing is that each mind performs a random walk on the set of outcomes, with the prescribed quantum probabilities.
Take now an EPR setting in which Alice and Bob happen to measure the same observable. The overall state of the two particle system and the two observers will evolve into a superposition of only two branches:
(A) Consider a single run of the experiment. When (the physical) Alice measures spin her set of minds splits into two subsets of size one-half. Call them A+ and A−. Similarly for Bob, whose set of minds splits into B+ and B− with the same proportions. If we follow the track of a single Alice-mind in A+ we see that it ends up believing a + result with probability one-half (and similarly for the minds in A−, B+ and B−. If the same measurements are repeated N times the minds in each of these subsets trace paths connecting N vertices on the binary tree of possible results.
(B) Consider for example Alice's minds in the subset A− immediately after a single measurement. These minds of Alice can form true beliefs about the beliefs that Bob will express later, when they meet to compare results. In particular, a mind in A− will believe that Bob will express beliefs in accordance with the minds in B+. Given the quantum state (6) , no communication between Alice and Bob is required for the formation of Alice's beliefs. The same goes for the minds in the other subsets. If, later, Alice and Bob communicate locally and compare notes it will always turn out that the path of an Alice mind in A+ (A−) is the mirror image of the path of a Bob mind in B− (B+) (and the quantum state will be a more complicated superposition of the form (6) including all the physical interactions involved in this communication).
(C) The fact is that Alice's and Bob's minds in the different subsets can form true beliefs about the beliefs of each other independently of whether or not they will communicate locally in the future. This establishes a perfect correlation between the subsets A− and B+ (and A+ and B−) prior to communication.
(D) The mind dynamics of Albert and Loewer does not, in itself, entail the correlations described in (B) and one has to add it, as an extra assumption to make the interpretation compatible with quantum theory.
We call (A), (B), (C), (D) weak minds-correlations (weak nonlocality).
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Note that these correlations express what one may call a 'preestablished harmony' between Alice's and Bob's subsets of minds (not between individual minds) which is formed immmediately after the two measurements on the wings of the EPR setting. The minds-correlations lead only to weak nonlocality, because unlike hidden variable theories, the evolution of the minds on the two wings of the experiment is governed only by the local reduced states. Note further that if one insists, as Albert and Loewer do, that Alice's and Bob's beliefs are independent of each other, one must add ex hypothesis the correlations that Alice and Bob discover after their meeting. In this sense, the correlations will be unexplained.
Consider an alternative argument: Suppose that a third observer (call her Carol) were to measure whether or not the composite state of particle 1 and 2 and of Alice's and Bob's brain is indeed the one given by (6) . So Carol measures a non local observable (call it χ) of which the state (6) is an eigenstate with eigenvalue +1. A measurement of χ will then yield the result +1 with probability one 7 without thereby changing the state (6) . This means that the following conditional is true: "If Carol were to measure χ, then she would know with probability one that the minds of Alice and Bob are (anti-)correlated"
8 . Moreover, she would know that there is now a matter of fact about the (anti-)correlations of the minds. That is, the result of the χ measurement is faithful.
In Albert and Loewer's version this means the following: All the minds of Carol agree on the result +1 of the χ measurement . Therefore, Carol can predict with certainty that Alice's and Bob's minds will exhibit the anti correlations when they communicate. Perhaps even Alice could perform the χ measurement on herself (see Albert [1] ) without locally communicating the results to Bob (and likewise Bob). If this is true, it implies that they both Alice and Bob will know, by the result of the χ measurement, that their minds are (anti) correlated. (But note that they will not know which Alice-minds are matched with which Bob-minds.)
We see that there are indeed weak nonlocal cross-wing correlations between the subsets of minds of the two observers. However, it is a weak nonlocality which doesn't contradict Bell's theorem. What is crucial in Bell's theorem is the existence of a single probability measure defined over all possible (actual and counterfactual) measurements. And this is just what is denied by Albert and Loewer by stipulating that the evolution of the minds of each observer is fixed by that observer's reduced state alone. In this way the derivation of a Bell inequality is formally blocked. By contrast, in the case of the versions which reject a stochastic dynamics for the minds (and assume supervenience of the mental on the physical) there just is, by definition, a single probability measure over the set of minds which agrees with all quantum mechanical predictions. 9 This assumption leads directly to Bell's theorem.
Many Minds and GHZ
An even more revealing case of a weak minds-correlation is that of Greenberger, Horne and Zeilinger (GHZ) [12] (See Mermin [17] ). We will now show what the weak nonlocality in the many minds picture implies with respect to counterfactuals. Since in Albert and Loewer's version the individual minds retain their identity throughout time, we can ask what a mind would have seen if another experiment was chosen. We shall see that in the GHZ case the usual quantum correlations and algebraic relations between the observables entail strong constraints on such counterfactuals, even for individual minds.
Consider the GHZ-state
where the kets |± z i (i = 1, 2, 3) denote the z-spin state of particle i. Suppose that the three particles are located in space-like separated regions. In this state standard quantum mechanics predicts a + or − result of the local measurements of the z-spin of each particle with probability one-half (with collapse onto the corresponding branch). And likewise for measurements of the x-and y-spins of each particle.
However, for this specific state standard quantum mechanics also predicts certain correlations between the results of the three observers, in particular the correlations described by the algebraic relations
It is easy to see that the state (7) is an eigenstate of the four observables with eigenvalues indicated on the right. Assuming that the local observables σ i x , σ i y take on definite values that are fixed locally, and satisfy the correlations (8), we can easily derive the contradiction
This is the GHZ simplification of Bell's theorem.
In standard quantum mechanics (with a collapse hypothesis) this contradiction is avoided since the local observables σ (X) If the three observers choose to measure the x-spins of their particles (call it the x-context), then with probability one, whatever result each of them obtains, observer 1 will obtain a + (−) result if and only if the product of the results of observers 2 and 3 is − (+).
(Y) If observers 2 and 3 choose to measure the y-spin of their particles (call it the y-context), and observer 1 still happens to measure the x-spin of his particle, then with probability one, whatever result each of them obtains, observer 1 will obtain a + (−) result if and only if the product of the results of observers 2 and 3 is + (−).
Let us now consider what these correlations imply in Albert and Loewer's version. We will show that in this version whatever result is perceived by any given mind of observer 1 depends nonlocally on which observables get measured by observers 2 and 3. Suppose that as a matter of fact the three observers carry out their local measurements in the x-context, i. e. they measure the observables σ 1 x , σ 2 x , σ 3 x respectively. Consider the expansion of the GHZ-state (in the x-spin basis) when these measurements are over:
In this final state we can see that the marginal probabilities for a + or − result of the local measurements of each observer is one-half (that is, the proportions of the minds of each observer perceiving a + or − result are exactly onehalf). Moreover, as in the singlet state, the (anti-)correlations described by (X) above are brought about since the quantum mechanical amplitudes of the branches with strict correlations in the state (10) is now zero. Hence, when the final state (10) obtains the minds of the three observers are weakly correlated now, in the sense that the quantum mechanical unconditional probability that these correlations will obtain on measurement is one. A similar analysis applies for the y-context. Given this weak minds-correlation we can divide the minds of the three observers in the x-context into four subsets of minds corresponding to the four branches of the state (10) . In two of these subsets the minds of observer 1 perceive a + result and the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive results that are different in sign, either +− or −+. Let us call these two subsets the upchannel. In the other two subsets the minds of observer 1 perceive a − result while the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive the same results, either ++ or −−. Call these two subsets the down-channel. In the Albert and Loewer version for each mind of each one of the three observers the probability of ending up in either the up-or the down-channel is exactly one-half.
Suppose now that (contrary to fact) the three observers were to carry out the measurements in the y-context instead of the x-context. In this case we would obtain a state similar to (6) but with the strict correlations described by (Y) above where the amplitudes for anti correlations is exactly zero. That is, we shall also have two final channels: an up * -channel in which the minds of observer 1 perceive a + result and the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive the same results, either ++ or −−; and a down * -channel in which the minds of observer 1 perceive a − result while the minds of observers 2 and 3 perceive different results, either +− or −+. Again the probability for each mind of the three observers to end up in either one of the two * -channels is one-half.
We now argue that in the Albert and Loewer version the evolution of the minds in the GHZ setting can recover the quantum mechanical correlations (described by (9) To see why such a constraint must be satisfied suppose that it did not. This means that for each mind of observer 1 that happens to follow the up-channel in the x-context there is a non-zero chance of evolving into the up * -channel in the y-context. Then, on the many minds picture, we shall obtain in fact that a positive fraction of the up-channel minds (of observer 1) are also up * -minds (although it is contingent which of the up-minds will turn out to be an up * -mind). Now, perhaps the essential feature of the Albert and Loewer version is that for each mind there is a fact of the matter (though contingent) as to which channel it happens to follow in each of the two contexts. Given a mind of observer 1 that happens to evolve into the upand up * channels, we can easily derive a contradiction from the GHZ relations (9) . Therefore, in the Albert and Loewer version such minds cannot exist, and so the evolution of the minds of each observer depends nonlocally on which observables get measured in space-like separated regions in the sense of the weak minds correlation in the state (10).
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10 We are not certain as to how the counterfactual argument above applies to other many minds interpretations in which the identity of a mind is associated with a complete history Finally, let us make two remarks about the above argument. (i) On the Albert and Loewer version whatever minds of each observer end up in each channel are not rigidly attached to one another. That is, the minds of observers 2 and 3 that follow the up-channel in the x-context will not always be the same minds that happen to follow the up * -channel in the y-context. This will happen because the actual evolution of the minds in each context is truly stochastic. But this fact is irrelevant to the above argument. Recall that what the proof shows is that there is a correlation between which channel the minds of observer 1 happen to follow (i. e. what result they perceive) in the x-context and which channel the same minds (of observer 1) follow (what result they perceive) in the y-context. To derive the contradiction it is sufficient to assume that there are some minds λ 1 i of observer 1 in both the up and up * channels.
(ii) It is evident that the above proof exhibits a counterfactual relation since the measurements of the local observables in the two contexts do not commute. Thus in counterfactual terms given that one-half of the minds of observer 1 evolve into the up-channel, our proof shows that all these minds would have evolved (with certainty) into the down * channel had observers
